CO129-497 - Public Offices - 1926 — Page 440

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pursuit of that policy than their predecessors ever were.

The obrious counter measure would be the

resurrection of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, The

difficulties, however, of effecting such a

resurrection are great and may be briefly

summarised as follows:-

(1) It is easier to denounce than to

renew an alliance.

(2) Conditions have altered considerably in

Japan, where the rise of industrialism pas poroduced

O more democratio tanti-militarios spint and which

has induced successive Japanese Governments

to display a more friendly attitude towards

Bolshevist Russie than they ever did towards

Czari gm. This new spirit would, it iar feared,

considerably hamper any Japanese Government

if it were to renew an alliance with us for

the purpose of combating Bolshevism. This

new spirit has also, it is believed, considerably

modified Japanese policy vis-à-vis of China.

It no longer aims at the absorption of Manchuria

by military means, but rather contemplates the

economic

i(

economic penetration of China.

(3) This new orientation in Japanese

policy may lead to a divergence of

views between us and the Japanese

in our respective attitudes towards

China, and thus create a further

obstacle to a renewal of the old alliance.

3.

It is considered, therefore, that

•

the prospects of securing Japanese assistance

av

by means of an alliance a so problematical

as to be hardly worth the attempt, the same

time we should maintain our present policy

of cultivating the friendliet relations with

Japan as far as may be compatible with the

promotion of British interests, and we should

endeavour to avoid the adoption of any policy

which did not allow us to look upon her as

a friend. If possible, common action with her

against Russian aggression should be encouraged,

and British policy should be based upon the

assumption that Russia is the enemy and not

dread

Japan. The most that we have to/from the

latter